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I. INTRODUCTION 
“When the well is dry, we know the worth of water.”1 
 . . . .  
 “Only what is rare is valuable, and water, which is the best of all 
things . . . is also the cheapest.”2 
 
                                              *   *   * 
 
These two quotes personify the current challenge facing water sus-
tainability and the role of markets.
3
  Reflected in these words is a tradi-
tional economic model of supply and demand and the widespread water 
crisis this model can create if left unchecked.  While water has a high 
value for society, the price assigned to it often does not reflect true val-
ue.
4
  Low prices send an inaccurate signal about supply and disincentiv-
ize efficient use.
5
  In this paradigm, society does not attach true value to 
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an item until there is a limited or dwindling supply available driving up 
prices.
6
 
While this economic system may work well for luxury and discre-
tionary goods by moving them to the highest valued user, this approach 
is not effective if the goal is sharing and sustainability.
7
  The goal for wa-
ter is to keep the well from running dry and to ensure that everyone’s 
basic needs are met.
8
  To accomplish that, value must attach before scar-
city forces a price increase.
9
  Price signals need to precede a shortage to 
prevent one.
10
 
For many parts of the U.S., water resources are already in crisis.
11
  
This is particularly true in the drought-prone Southwest, where popula-
tion growth and demand are quickly outpacing supply.
12
  Although new 
supply projects are often proposed to solve the problem, programs to re-
duce usage are also critical.
13
  Often, demand is driven by traditional use 
and does not include maximum reduction through conservation and effi-
ciency.
14
  When these programs are implemented, demand forecasts alter 
dramatically, but for this to happen, citizens first need to be motivated to 
change.
15
 
Before scarcity forces a change in behavior, a customer’s only con-
nection with water is its price.
16
  In cities where citizens only pay for 
treatment and delivery and not the actual water, cost does not reflect val-
ue.
17
  Many rural users do not pay anything for the water itself.
18
  This 
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disconnect between current pricing and water’s social importance raises 
questions about valuation theory and supply–demand economics.19  One 
reason the current market model does not work is because it does not 
consider important factors such as the public good aspect of the re-
source.
20
 
In addition, the existing pricing model is problematic because there 
is no mechanism for a rapid rate adjustment to affect behavior and scale 
back demand in emergency situations.
21
  Competing water interests use 
economics to defend their use, arguing that water should flow towards 
the most valuable use.
22
  For example, supporters of hydraulic fracturing 
often cite the value of the product yielded from the water used, as com-
pared to a comparable agricultural product.
23
  However, these arguments 
fail to include the intrinsic costs of the use, including dewatering or 
threatening species or the value of the agricultural economy.
24
  Sustaina-
ble water for all uses requires a hard review of how economics is applied 
to water.  Any economic modeling must include value as well at intrinsic 
costs to ensure wise allocation decisions.
25
  With market adjustments, 
price can better match value, thus creating a tool for efficient use. 
This Article examines the application of basic market principles to 
water transactions and the problems it creates.  It considers how the ba-
sics of supply and demand can create inaccurate price signals resulting in 
water supply depletion and other unintended consequences.  The Article 
proposes market adjustments that could be made to increase the useful-
ness of markets as a corollary to a system of legal permits.  Part II pro-
vides a short snapshot of the water sustainability challenges facing many 
parts of the U.S. and explains why effective planning is necessary to 
avoid dire consequences.  Part III describes basic economic principles of 
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supply and demand and some economic theories that attempt to explain 
these norms.  It also reviews existing water policy that implies the im-
portance of water.  Part IV demonstrates the results of applying markets 
to water.  The section considers how, if used properly, price can be used 
as a behavior trigger and why the present system is not doing this effec-
tively.  This section also proposes what is missing in the current system 
of valuation. 
Part V illustrates specific examples of how the application of the cur-
rent market system to water creates unintended consequences.  These 
elucidate the proposition that markets, if not adjusted, can actually work 
against the best use of the resource.  Finally, Part VI proposes possible 
market changes that would shift markets away from the problems they 
currently create towards becoming a useful tool for sustainability.  These 
proposals include internalizing the values of water dependent resources 
such as ecosystems in the price of water so dewatering can take these 
impacts into consideration.  Further, municipal water price structures 
need the ability to adjust price to include water savings as cost savings; 
and agriculture users must pay more for water, but also be protected by 
markets.  This Article concludes that markets can be an effective corol-
lary to legal management of water resources, but only if true capture of 
value is included. 
II. WATER: THE SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGE 
It is not newsworthy to state that water is necessary for life.
26
  A hu-
man can only survive approximately three days without water,
27
 yet soci-
etal decisions regarding water are rarely made based on this intrinsic 
truth.  Instead, water use decisions are based on factors such as availabil-
ity, location, price, and highest economic use.
28
  Most of the U.S. still 
does not plan based on the reality that water will not be available for all 
users all the time.
29
  Many regions are learning the hard way that ade-
quate water supply is not a guarantee, but allocation systems do not yet 
                                                          
 26.  See How Long Can We Survive Without Food or Water?, CBC NEWS (May 7, 2011, 12:46 
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match this reality.
30
  The current system may work when there is a suffi-
cient amount of water, but it is unclear what happens in times of scarci-
ty.
31
 
Water is critical not only to personal survival, but also to the survival 
of the economy and culture of a community as well as their various users 
such as power generators, agriculture, and industry.
32
  Society’s ability to 
survive and thrive depends on the guarantee of sufficient water supply, 
yet that is not a luxury upon which all locations can rely.
33
 
Water scarcity is a growing problem for many parts of the U.S.
34
  
Although, the American Southwest has been dealing with this for many 
years, even traditionally water-rich areas face the threat of brutal 
drought.
35
  “In the last five years, nearly every region of the country ex-
perienced water shortages.  At least thirty-six states are anticipating lo-
cal, regional, or statewide water shortages by 2013, even under non-
drought conditions.”36 
One of the challenges with water is how little of it is actually availa-
ble for use, even under normal conditions.
37
  Less than one percent of the 
world’s water is available for human use and much of that is located un-
derground at varying depths.
38
  Additionally, not only is the world using 
more water, we are using it in a way that leaves it unavailable for other 
users.
39
  World water consumption has tripled in the last fifty years.
40
  
This combination of factors elucidates the depth of the water supply 
challenge. 
Drought exacerbates any existing issues with supply inadequacy.  
                                                          
 30.  See, e.g., Paul Rogers, California drought: Why is there no mandatory water rationing?, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 15, 2014, http://www.mercurynews.com/science/ 
ci_25153774/california-drought-why-is-there-no-mandatory-water. 
 31.  Adler, supra note 29, at 730–31. 
 32.  See COMBS, supra note 8. 
 33.  A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 13 (2013).   
 34.  Ferner, supra note 11. 
 35.  Water Supply In the U.S., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/WaterSense/pubs/supply.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter  
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 40.  Id. 
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From 2011 to 2013, half of the U.S. experienced varying levels of 
drought.
41
  At the beginning of 2013, 60% of the U.S. experienced mod-
erate to exceptional drought.
42
  While the drought has alleviated in some 
areas, other regions remain in peril.
43
  Several major metropolitan areas 
located on the East Coast, the Midwest, and the western U.S. are at risk 
of a water shortage.
44
 
The combination of population concentration and limited water in 
these areas will impact large amounts of domestic users as well as indus-
trial and commercial sectors.
45
  Power generation can also be at risk, 
which aggravates urban regions.
46
  Outside cities, drought can cripple the 
agricultural industry, which has economic ripple effects outside the rural 
community.
47
  The High Plains Aquifer in the Midwest is a perfect ex-
ample.
48
  The land in this area is used to raise crops and livestock used 
throughout the country.
49
  The 2011–2012 drought necessitated increased 
groundwater mining for irrigation.
50
  This magnified pumping reduced 
aquifer levels to one-third of their total decline since 1996.
51
 
Beyond economic impacts, lack of water can have environmental 
and social impacts as well.
52
  Water is needed for environmental users as 
much as it is for humans.
53
  In addition to the intrinsic value of the envi-
ronment, the destruction of habitat and wildlife affects regional econom-
ics as well.
54
  The presence of endangered species in a water stressed ar-
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 44.  Id. 
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 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  NATIONAL DROUGHT MITIGATION CENTER, supra note 46. 
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 54.  See, e.g., Robert Lee Maril, Shrimping Industry, HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE, available at 
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/dxs02 (discussing the economics of the Texas 
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ea adds an additional level of concern and cost, beyond financial.
55
  The 
recreation and tourism sectors are often forgotten in drought analysis, but 
their losses can be substantial, particularly in areas where they constitute 
a large part of the local economy.
56
  Finally, there is a cultural value to 
water.  While it is difficult to quantify this financially, this “sense of 
place” affects all surrounding users during shortage.57 
Despite this varied array of uses and dependencies on water, existing 
legal allocation schemes often do not effectively react to drought and 
shortage.
58
  As supply quantities decline, accountability between users 
increases and the market is often the only tool available to manage be-
havior; however, the market does not always accurately value goods.
59
  
In addition, non-paying users, such as the environment, are unable to par-
ticipate unless an advocate intercedes on their behalf. 
III. DETERMINING THE FLOW OF WATER: UNDERSTANDING THE 
CURRENT MARKET MODEL 
While scarcity affects all water users, water sustainability is not the 
primary consideration of allocation regimes.
60
  At best, current permit-
ting systems are designed to react to a shortage of water rather than 
working to avoid one.
61
  Existing water permitting relies either on prox-
imity to a water source or on a first come, first serve basis.
62
  Unfortu-
                                                          
 55.  See id.; Lisa Lien-Mager, Water Supplies Curtailed Once Again to Protect Delta Smelt, 
ASS’N OF CAL. WATER AGENCIES (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.acwa.com/news/delta/water-supplies-
curtailed-once-again-protect-delta-smelt (describing a reduction of agricultural water deliveries in 
order to protect the endangered Delta smelt habitat). 
 56.  Deborah S K Thomas et. al., A Comprehensive Framework for Tourism and Recreation 
Drought Vulnerability Reduction, 8 ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS, no. 4, 2–3 (Oct.–Dec. 2013), avail-
able at http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/8/4/044004/pdf/1748-9326_8_4_044004.pdf. 
 57.  See COMMUNITY CULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING A 
SENSE OF PLACE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, at 2, available at http://www.epa.gov/care/library/comm-
unity_culture.pdf (“We live among, and are deeply connected to, the many streams, rivers, [and] 
lakes . . . that compose our natural environment and make it the beautiful and livable place so many 
of us value.”). 
 58.  See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 30 (describing the state government’s inability to require 
mandatory water rationing in California). 
 59.  See VAN DER ZAAG & SAVENIJE, supra note 28, at 19–23 (discussing different values of 
water according to location, time and type of use). 
 60.  See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (Cal. 1855).  In Irwin, often cited for creating the pri-
or appropriation system, the court notes that the important aspect of the system is to preserve the 
rights of those who are first in time.  Id.  See also TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 267. 
 61.  See TARLOCK, supra note 33 at 269. 
 62.  P. FRITZ HOLLEMAN, WATER RIGHTS AND TAKINGS: INHERENT LIMITS ON THE PROPERTY 
RIGHT AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, CLE INTERNATIONAL H-1–H-2, available at 
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nately, due to the meteoric increase of population and consumption, the 
water landscape has changed dramatically from the time when the major-
ity of rights were perfected or permitted.
63
  Current projections for many 
areas show that increase in demand coupled with climate change varia-
tions will create shortages even in non-drought years.
64
  Despite this real-
ity, none of these regimes include a mechanism to reevaluate the wisdom 
or the efficiency of a use once the property right has been perfected.
65
  
 Although legal systems may dictate reduced usage in times of 
drought, this reduction is strictly temporary and not tied to any perma-
nent prioritization of the best uses of the water.
66
  Currently, the only 
mechanism to shift permitted water from one user to another is through 
water markets.
67
  However, the buying and selling of water also does not 
guarantee that the best uses are protected.
68
  In fact, “[m]ore than for 
most commodities, social and cultural values relating to water are often 
in conflict with economic values.”69  In order to promote sustainability, 
some changes are required. 
A. The Basics of Supply and Demand 
Supply is the quantity of an item available in the marketplace at a 
                                                          
http://www.pbblaw.com/articles/Holleman%20-%20Water%20Rights%20and%20Takings%20%-
2800011376%29.PDF. 
 63.  For example, in a prior appropriation jurisdiction, any proposed use in a permit application 
must be deemed “beneficial.”  Id. at H-3.  The determination of a right as beneficial occurs at the 
time of the permit issuance or perfection of the right.  Id. at H-4.  Although the list of approved ben-
eficial uses may change over time, any permit issued continues to be valid even if the use is no long-
er deemed beneficial because the permit is a property right; therefore, a revocation of a permit based 
solely on use would generally be subject to a takings challenge.  Id. at H-1, H-5. 
 64.  Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Water Markets, NATURAL RES. Winter 2008, at 14, 
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2008/11/v31n4-3.pdf. 
 65.  See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.001(a) (West 2008) (defining water permits as a 
vested property right). 
 66.  Such a system can lead to challenging drought scenarios.  See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 30.  
In a prior appropriation system, many agricultural permits are senior to newer municipal and power 
generation permits.  In drought conditions, the system only considers the date of the permit and not 
the type of use so a power plant may need to power down to allow farmers to receive their full allo-
cation. 
 67.  See ERIN SCHILLER & ELIZABETH FOWLER, PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ENDING CALI-
FORNIA’S WATER CRISIS: A MARKET SOLUTION TO THE POLITICS OF WATER 1 (July 1999), availa-
ble at http://special.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/enviro/watermkts/watermkts.html (proposing that 
water markets are the strongest solution to California’s water crisis).  
 68.  ROBERT A. YOUNG, DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER: CONCEPTS AND 
METHODS 8 (2005). 
 69.  Id. 
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given price.
70
  All other things being equal, an increase in supply of a 
product or service will cause price of the item to decrease.
71
  Although 
many things can affect supply, “[t]he most important influence on the 
position of the supply curve is the cost of producing a good or service.”72  
One example of this is a price reduction for goods because of the reduc-
tion of an input price, such as labor.
73
  The flip side of this notion is often 
seen in the case of water; as more expensive technology is required to 
provide adequate supply, price will increase.
74
 
Demand is the quantity of a good that individuals are willing and 
able to purchase at a given price.
75
  Similar to the relationship on the 
supply side, price and demand are inversely related: as one increases, the 
other decreases and vice versa.
76
  While this is true of an individual’s be-
havior, the focus for economists is more often on market demand, which 
is the amalgamation of individual demand for an item or service at alter-
native prices.
77
  If the number of consumers increases, the market de-
mand will also increase.
78
 
Although supply and demand are separate and can work inde-
pendently with price, they often work together to determine the market 
price of an item.
79
  The supply and demand curve is one of the primary 
concepts taught in a microeconomics class.
80
  This curve is an economic 
model of price determination in a competitive market.
81
  Demand indi-
cates what an item is worth to someone while supply reflects what some-
thing costs.
82
  In a competitive market, the unit price for a particular good 
will vary until it settles at a price point where the quantity demanded 
                                                          
 70.  See EKELUND, JR. & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 61–62; FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, 
at 66. 
 71.  See EKELUND, JR. & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 61–62.  
 72.  Id. at 63.  
 73.  Id. at 63–64.  
 74.  See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, In California, What Price Water?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01/business/energy-environment/a-costly-california-
desalination-plant-bets-on-future-affordability.html?_r=0 (discussing the price of an expensive de-
salination plant in California). 
 75.  See EKELUND, JR. & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 54–55.  
 76.  Id. at 61–62. “The demand curve expresses an inverse relation between price of a good and 
the quantity demanded.” Id. at 60. 
 77.  Id. at 60. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 65–72. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
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equals the quantity supplied.
83
  This results in an economic equilibrium 
for both price and quantity for the item.
84
  Markets are an effective sys-
tem to allocate resources because when a good is in equilibrium, the 
price provides information to suppliers about the ideal price and demand 
of that good.
85
 
The supply and demand model is based on four basic laws that are 
critical to its function.
86
  If demand increases while supply remains con-
stant, a shortage will occur, which will drive up the price of the items.
87
  
In contrast, if the demand decreases, but supply remains unchanged, the 
price per item will decrease because there is a market surplus.
88
  The 
same is true if you reverse demand with supply in both scenarios.
89
  Ul-
timately, price is determined by the relationship between how much of 
something is in the market and how badly it is desired by buyers.
90
 
B. Water Through the Lens of Economic Theory 
The market approach can be applied to water.  In fact, in the absence 
of any limiting polices, it is already happening to some extent.
91
  While 
the initial permitting phase is dictated by governments, economics does 
come into play in post-permitting water conveyances when a buyer, 
without sufficient water (low supply, high demand), purchases water 
from an existing permit holder (high supply, low demand).
92
  The price 
for the conveyance is presumably set based on this supply and demand 
relationship.
93
  This transaction is simply a market transfer of a property 
right.
94
  Therefore, the appropriate question is not whether this economic 
                                                          
 83.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 68. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 84. 
 86.  Id. at 82, Figure 3.17. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 81–82. 
 91.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 12–14. 
 92.  Id. at 13; Compare e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.135 (West 2012) (listing the criteria 
required for surface water permit issuance in Texas), with e.g., Betsy Blaney, T. Boone Pickens Sells 
Water Rights to Texas Water Supplier for $103 Million, NEWSOK (June 24, 2011), 
http://newsok.com/t.-boone-pickens-sells-water-rights-to-texas-water-supplier-for-103-
million/article/3579874 (describing a large water transaction). 
 93.  See FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 81–82. 
 94.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 13. 
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model can be applied to water, but whether it should be.
95
 
One of the functions of markets is to distribute goods among those 
who want them.
96
  Price ensures that those who ultimately obtain the 
good are the ones who value it the most, but value can have many differ-
ent meanings.
97
  In water, there might be a price value—what a willing 
seller will sell to a willing buyer—but this numeric quantity often does 
not match the societal value of water.
98
  Another issue with this approach 
is that it assumes that the individual who most values the item has the 
funds to pay that price.
99
  This system works well for commodity markets 
and the exchange of unnecessary items, but falls short when an item is 
necessary for survival.
100
 
A second function of price is to direct productive resources to differ-
ent sectors of the economy.
101
  “Resources leave markets in which price 
cannot cover the cost of production and enter those in which price ex-
ceeds the cost of production.”102  Again, a disconnect exists between the 
market and reality when applied to water.  Unintended consequences re-
sult when water is left solely to market forces because water is not some-
thing that can leave a market without major negative impacts to a com-
munity.
103
  This also assumes that water, like other products, can easily 
be transported from one market to another, which is not currently possi-
ble.
104
 
Economic theorists use these assumptions to explain the supply and 
demand curves, as well as to understand the relationship between value 
and price and where the two can diverge.
105
  It is useful to evaluate the 
impacts of these economic theories on water markets to understand how 
markets can better be utilized to protect the resource. 
                                                          
 95.  See HANEMANN, supra note 4, at 12.  
 96.  See FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 178. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  HANEMANN, supra note 4, at 19.  
 99.  See FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 178. 
 100.  See id.; HANEMANN, supra note 4, at 12. 
 101.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 178.  This is defined as the allocative function of 
price.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 184.  
 104.  HANEMANN, supra note 4, at 15–16. 
 105.  See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Development of Utility Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 307, 307 
(1950). 
  
904 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
1. Adam Smith’s Paradox 
The allocative and rationing function of markets discussed above 
provides the foundation for economist and philosopher Adam Smith’s 
theory of the invisible hand of the market.
106
  According to Smith, this 
hand dictates participants’ promotion of the efficient use of resources.107  
Commodities are moved to markets and made available based on con-
sumer desires.
108
  Of course, this theory is based on the ability of a con-
sumer to purchase a particular desired item.
109
 
As early as 1776, Adam Smith recognized the frequent disconnect 
between price and value, noting that consumer choice is not always ra-
tional.
110
  He used the paradox of water and diamonds to illustrate.
111
  
“Nothing is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce any thing; 
scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contra-
ry, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods 
may frequently be had in exchange or it.”112 
Smith expanded on this paradox by bifurcating types of value.
113
 
The one may be called ‘value in use;’ the other, ‘value in exchange.’
114
  
Value in exchange refers to the price paid whereas the value in use in-
cludes the item’s overall importance to the consumer or society.
115
  The 
things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no 
value in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest 
value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use.
116
 
While there are simple market explanations that can explain this paradox, 
it raises questions about the helpfulness of markets in protecting im-
portant resources.
117
 
At the time of Mr. Smith’s writings, diamonds were far scarcer than 
water; therefore, application of supply and demand quickly explain the 
                                                          
 106.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 178. 
 107.  ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
363–364 (1776). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See id. at 30. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See SMITH, supra note 107, at 30. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 82, Figure 3.17. 
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price differential.
118
  “[W]ater commands little in exchange because its 
supply is so abundant relative to the intensity of consumer desire for 
it.”119  While this may explain the paradox it does not avoid the problem 
it elucidates.
120
 
Smith’s theory stated that cost is tied to the difficulty of acquisition 
and that labor was the true measure for the exchangeable value of an 
item.
121
  The labor theory posits that it is the work required for someone 
to purchase an item that determines how badly it is wanted or needed.
122
  
According to Smith, labor is the original currency.
123
  This theory can be 
seen in the current water business model and is easily linked back to 
scarcity.
124
  Water has historically been easy to obtain, keeping prices 
low.  But as communities deplete resources and move to desalination or 
long-haul water projects for new supply, the labor required increases, fol-
lowed by price.
125
 
2. Utility Theory 
While Smith’s model was an important step in economic theory, it 
was criticized for not including the later born concept of utility, which 
was added by later theorists attempting to solve the water–diamond para-
dox.
126
  Utility is an abstract concept that represents a relative value 
through the use of arbitrary units.
127
  This subjective theory of value 
means that the value of a good is not determined by any inherent proper-
ty of the good or the labor required to produce it.
128
  Instead, the value is 
generated by the importance placed on that good by an individual for a 
specific purpose.
129
 
Utility can further be divided into marginal and total utility.
130
  Total 
utility is the total amount of satisfaction derived from consuming a prod-
                                                          
 118.  See SMITH, supra note 107, at 147; cf. FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 82 & Figure 
3.17 (arguing that Smith ignored scarcity, which he clearly did not). 
 119.  EKELUND, JR. & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 147. 
 120.  See SMITH, supra note 107, at 30. 
 121.  SMITH, supra note 107, at 31. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  See Barringer, supra note 74. 
 126.  EKELUND, JR. & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 147–48. 
 127.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 126. 
 128.  EKELUND, JR. & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 137–39.  
 129.  Id. at 137–138.  
 130.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 126–29. 
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uct.
131
  The marginal utility is the amount that the total utility changes 
when consumption changes by one unit.
132
  This theory was not available 
when Smith created his paradox; however, the utility theory can be ap-
plied to solve the paradox.
133
  While the marginal utility of diamonds is 
larger, the total utility of water exceeds that of diamonds.
134
 
Generally, the more a person consumes, the larger his or her total 
utility will be.
135
  In contrast, marginal utility usually decreases with each 
additional increase in the consumption of a good.
136
  There is a certain 
threshold of satisfaction; therefore, the consumer will not receive the 
same pleasure from consumption once that threshold quantity is 
crossed.
137
  The law of diminishing marginal utility helps explain the law 
of demand and the negative sloping demand curve.
138
  The less of some-
thing an individual has, the more satisfaction is gained from each addi-
tional unit consumed and the more he or she is willing to pay for it.
139
  
Prices are lower when a higher quantity is demanded because the addi-
tional satisfaction diminishes as demand increases.
140
 
Economist Eugen Böhm von Bawerk illustrated the utility concept 
by using a parable about sacks of grain.
141
  According to von Bawerk, if a 
farmer only has five sacks of grain, he would use the first two to make 
food for himself; the first to survive and second to thrive.
142
  If he has 
three sacks he would use the first two sacks the same way, but use the 
third to feed the chickens.
143
  While still an important use, the marginal 
value of the third use is less than the use for the first two sacks.
144
  A 
fourth sack would be used to make brandy and the fifth would go to the 
parrots, which are kept for entertainment.
145
  If the farmer only received 
                                                          
 131.  EKELUND, JR. & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 841. 
 132.  Id. at 838. 
 133.  Id. at 147. 
 134.  Id. at 147–48. 
 135.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 126–29. 
 136.  Id. at 129. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  EKELUND, JR. & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 148. 
 139.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 129. 
 140.  EKELUND, JR. & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 148. 
 141.  George Reisman, Introduction to Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Value, Cost, and Marginal 
Utility ii, xii–xiii (George Reisman trans., 2002) (1892) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.capitalism.net/articles/Reisman%20Full.pdf. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at xiii.  
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
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four sacks of grain, he would not reduce each use pro rata because the 
value of each use is not equal.
146
  Instead, he would discontinue the least 
valued use and not feed the parrots and use the remaining grain for his 
more basic needs.
147
 
The utility theory has a very revealing application to water.  Much 
like the grain analogy—when consumers have large amounts of water at 
their disposal, they will not differentiate uses and are more likely to 
waste.
148
  One cup of water can be easily replaced so it has a small mar-
ginal utility.
149
  This is not true for diamonds.  However, when water is 
scarce and at a premium, the marginal value increases and uses will be 
prioritized.
150
  Less vital uses, such as lawn watering will diminish.
151
  
Currently, low prices hinder the consumer’s ability to properly measure 
the true value of water because they indicate a large supply, even when 
that is not true.
152
  Although some of the economic theories of valuation 
are already present in existing water policy, reflecting some concepts of 
societal valuation, they may not be sufficient to properly value water. 
C. Intrinsic Valuation in Current Legal Regimes 
While some may argue that water should be left to market condi-
tions, there is an underlying concern that arises when water is treated the 
same as other commodities.
153
  If all of the scarce diamonds go to the few 
people who are able to purchase them, an equity issue does not exist; 
however, that same scenario applied to water is not as defensible.
154
  That 
is why most communities have regulatory systems that, at least partially, 
control water allocation.
155
 
These legal systems reflect societies’ determination that water has a 
special value and should not be treated like a standard private good, but 
                                                          
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See id. 
 149.  See id. 
 150.  See id. 
 151.  See id. 
 152.  Ben Wright, Liquid Asset, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424052748703389004575033263189828020?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http 
%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052748703389004575033263189828020.
html. 
 153.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 13. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
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should be seen partially as a public good.
156
  A public good has two key 
properties: non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability.
157
  Non-
rival goods mean that one person’s use does not preclude another from 
their use and enjoyment.
158
  In contrast to a private good, a good is public 
“if the good is available for consumption by anybody, it is available for 
consumption by all.”159  Water is both a public and private good.  Alt-
hough water can be consumed privately and exclusively, “[w]ater is a 
common property resource, and all societies have asserted a community 
interest in the determination of the uses to which water is put and to 
whom access should be granted.”160 
1. Public Trust Doctrine 
Existing law provides some protection for public goods based on 
their non-excludability.
161
  One example of this is the public trust doc-
trine.
162
  This doctrine asserts that governments do not have unlimited 
discretion to decide whether citizens can be denied access to public re-
sources such as water.
163
  While the doctrine was first established in a 
case involving the denial of shore access, it has been expanded consider-
ably over the years.
164
 
Instead of allowing water resources to be held exclusively as private 
property, the doctrine includes the core concept that these public goods 
are held in trust by the government for the benefit of the public.
165
  Gov-
ernmental policies affecting these resources must comply with this con-
cept.
166
  “Thus, the public trust is more than an affirmation of state power 
to use public property for public purposes.  It is an affirmation of the du-
                                                          
 156.  HANEMANN, supra note 4, at 12–13; see TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 13. 
 157.  GRIFFIN, supra note 25, at 108. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  HANEMANN, supra note 4, at 13. 
 160.  Id.; TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 13. 
 161.  See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475–78 (1970) (describing the origins of the “public 
trust” doctrine under civil and common law systems); see also TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 152. 
 162.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 152. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Glennon, supra note 16, at 1900; compare Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387 (1892) 
(holding that the government cannot limit public access to lakefront), with Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. 
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (expanding the public 
trust to include the aesthetic and environmental values of lakes and other waterways). 
 165.  Sax, supra note 161, at 484–85. 
 166.  Id.; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728. 
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ty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, 
marshlands and tidelands . . . .” 167 
While courts have not prohibited the transfer of some elements of the 
trust to private control, courts will review these situations with increased 
scrutiny.
168
  The Supreme Court stated in Illinois Central Railroad that a 
state may not divest itself of the authority to govern an area where it has 
responsibility to exercise its police power.
169
  Although the Court did not 
specifically state the reasons for its ruling, its holding has been interpret-
ed to mean that the government’s role is to ensure the good of all its citi-
zenry.
170
  Access to water is a key component of that responsibility.
171
  
More recent state court rulings confirm a clear recognition that the poten-
tial for abuse exists whenever power over a public good is extended to an 
entity that is not accountable to the electorate.
172
 
Economists also distinguish between private goods, which include 
conventional market items and public goods.
173
  Private goods fit more 
easily into a traditional market model.
174
  If the demand of widgets out-
paces supply, the price goes up or the supplier can produce more to keep 
prices stable.
175
 
This is not always possible with water.
176
  Part of the traditional mar-
ket system will be at play—namely that price will increase with dimin-
ishing supply.
177
  However, unlike private goods, there may not be the 
option to create more “product” when the product is water.178  The cate-
gorization of water as private or public in this system depends on its 
use.
179
  In some settings it can be viewed as a rival good, while in others, 
it is not.
180
 
                                                          
 167.  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 724. 
 168.  Sax, supra note 161, at 488.  Statutes can be used to ensure that the public’s interests are 
considered when a sale is allowed to private citizens.  Id. at 548–49. 
 169.  146 U.S. at 453. 
 170.  Sax, supra note 161, at 490–91. 
 171.  See id. 
 172.  Id. at 491–92. 
 173.  YOUNG, supra note 68, at 6. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  See UN WATER, WORLD WATER DAY 2013 2, http://www.unwater.org/fileadmin/user 
_upload/watercooperation2013/doc/YWC2013_Brochure_web.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2014) (de-
scribing the fixed quantity of water on the earth). 
 179.  YOUNG, supra note 68, at 6. 
 180.  Id. 
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Although the full application potential of the public trust doctrine is 
unknown, it is an important policy principle that must be considered 
when evaluating the economics of water.
181
  The doctrine can be used as 
a tool to protect public resources and counter the transfer of water to a 
full market system.
182
  Current water allocation regimes are an excellent 
representation of the public trust principle.
183
 
2. Water Permitting 
The public trust doctrine is evident in most water allocation 
schemes.
184
  Permit systems are usually based on the concept that the wa-
ter belongs to the public, but is held in trust by the state.
185
  Water should 
be allocated in a way that maximizes benefits for more than the permit 
holder.
186
  This requires consideration of the community, the public na-
ture of the source, and the relationship water has with other resources.
187
  
A permit holder does not own a property right as he would in a normal 
commodity.
188
  He only owns a usufruct interest.
189
  This distinction in-
corporates the needs of others and the protection of their rights in the 
same resource because one person’s permitted use is always held in rela-
tion to other users.
190
 
There are two primary surface water allocation schemes in the U.S. 
and both seek to accomplish the goal of benefiting the community, not 
just the permit holder.
191
  The first of these is the doctrine of riparian 
rights.
192
  Used primarily in the eastern states, one of the requirements for 
use is reasonableness.
193
  The criteria for reasonable use require that 
                                                          
 181.  Sax, supra note 161, at 473–74, 556–57. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at 485. 
 184.  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 726–27 (Cal. 1983), cert denied, 
464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
 185.  See Sax, supra note 161, at 485–86; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 726–27; TEX. WA-
TER CODE ANN. § 11.0235(a) (West 2012). 
 186.  See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 726. 
 187.  Sax, supra note 161, at 485. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. A usufruct right gives the possessor the right to use or enjoy the property, but does not 
give the right of exclusive control conveyed by ownership through legal title.  1 TIFFANY REAL 
PROP. § 2 (3d ed. 2013). 
 190.  See Sax, supra note 161, at 485. 
 191.  See TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 231. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 105–06.  Some riparian jurisdictions adhere to the natural flow 
requirement.  Id. at 102.  This dictates that a riparian user cannot use water in such a way that dis-
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one’s use cannot unreasonably interfere with the use of another.194  This 
is determined by evaluating the proposed use in light of all the circum-
stances to ensure it is consistent with the corresponding enjoyment rights 
of other riparians.
195
  Courts have stated that the benefit of one user 
should be balanced against any injury to other users.
196
  While most uses 
are potentially reasonable, preference is given to high value uses such as 
domestic and livestock needs.
197
 
In the western states, the doctrine of prior appropriation has a similar 
requirement as that seen in riparian states.
198
  A permit applicant must 
show that the proposed use is beneficial.
199
  This requirement allows 
states and courts to ensure that water is used in a productive way and not 
wasted.
200
  Much like reasonable use, any use could potentially be con-
sidered beneficial; however, most jurisdictions enumerate acceptable us-
es.
201
  In addition to listing suitable uses, some states prioritize use types 
based on societal importance.
202
  Not surprisingly, domestic and munici-
pal uses are most important.
203
 
Water permitting regimes seek to extend a property right in the re-
source, but do not extend absolute ownership of the water to the permit 
holder.
204
  A market for water cannot function properly without a clear 
designation of property and quasi-property rights.
205
  This legal determi-
nation allows the rights to be obtained, used, and transferred.
206
  Alloca-
                                                          
turbs the water’s natural flow for the use and enjoyment of downstream users.  Id. at 102.  Because 
of the strict nature of such a rule, most jurisdictions have replaced natural flow with reasonable use.  
Id. at 105–06. 
 194.  Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420, 423 (1874). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Three Lakes Ass’n v. Kessler, 285 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
 197.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 104–05, 108. 
 198.  See id. at 332–37. 
 199.  Id. at 332.  “Beneficial use” means use of the amount of water which is economically nec-
essary for a purpose authorized by this chapter, when reasonable intelligence and reasonable dili-
gence are used in applying the water to that purpose and shall include conserved water.  TEX. WA-
TER CODE ANN. § 11.002(4) (West 2012). 
 200.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 333–36. 
 201.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 331.  E.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (West 2012). 
 202.  See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (West 2012). 
 203.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 336–37.  Some states also provide permit exemptions for do-
mestic and livestock uses up to a certain quantity.  E.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.303 (West 
2012). 
 204.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 29–30.  One exception to this is Right of Capture; however, 
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 205.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 13; see Adler, supra note 29, at 751. 
 206.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 13. 
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tion systems that create property rights in water recognize the intrinsic 
value of water.
207
  These systems are in place to promote the best use of 
the resource.
208
  Gaining a water right from a governmental entity aids in 
water management, rather than simply trusting one individual’s decision 
to use water however he or she sees fit.
209
  Unfortunately, even with the-
se goals in mind, the public good is not always protected when water 
goes to market. 
IV. APPLYING MARKETS TO WATER 
As a society, continued prosperity and survival is predicated on a 
sustainable water supply.
210
  One way to accomplish this goal is to ensure 
that water is used wisely and no one uses more than what is needed.  
Markets can help achieve this; however, price must be an accurate indi-
cator of value to be successful.
211
  Many argue that markets should not be 
applied to public goods like water.
212
  While there are good arguments 
for that idea, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. will stop pricing water.
213
  
In addition, zero valuation can lead to wasteful usage and result in a trag-
edy of the commons.
214
 
True value of water is not always reflected by market price.
215
  Many 
items that are not marketed commodities still have an economic value.
216
  
Price often does not match value because market value changes based on 
circumstances.
217
  At any given time, market value is dependent on many 
factors including supply (permanent and temporary) and demand (time of 
                                                          
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 13. 
 210.  See TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 13, 15. 
 211.  See HANEMANN, supra note 4, at 3. 
 212.  See YOUNG, supra note 68, at 9. 
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 214.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968), available at 
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 217.  Id. 
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year, weather).
218
  True value is more stable than market value.
219
  While 
a market system regime is not protective of water resources, policies can 
be adjusted to ensure markets incorporate currently absent considerations 
to strengthen valuation accuracy.
220
  Before those options are discussed, 
it is worth reviewing how markets are currently applied to water. 
A. Putting a Price on Water? 
There are two primary ways that individuals purchase water.  The 
first is through municipal water service billing.
221
  In this situation, a city 
provider, or other similar entity, holds legal access to the water and they 
disseminate the resource to their customers for a price.
222
  The second 
way an individual can obtain water is by purchasing another person or 
entity’s water right.223  “Market acquisitions of water rights are increas-
ingly common in regions where existing water supplies are fully appro-
priated and development of new supplies is costly . . . .”224  Water rights 
can be purchased by individuals or by water suppliers who then sell the 
water to their customers as described above in the first example.
225
 
1. Municipal Rates 
City dwellers might think that water already has a price because they 
receive a monthly water bill; however, they are usually not paying for the 
water itself.
226
  Instead, utilities bill for the infrastructure’s capital and 
operating costs.
227
  Because there are traditionally no costs associated 
                                                          
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
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with the actual water, overall prices have been kept low.
228
  A fact that is 
likely to change in future.
229
 
Municipal rate structures can vary considerably.
230
  While some 
charge a price regardless of use, others seek to penalize high volume us-
ers by charging based on usage.
231
  Flat rate structures assign a price per 
user regardless of amount used.
232
  Every user pays the same monthly 
amount.
233
  While this creates a predictable income for the utility, it may 
not match true value with use or provide price signals to users based on 
their individual usage.
234
  Flat fees can also be coupled with usage fees 
that vary based on amount used.
235
 
Another type of rate system is uniform volumetric rates.
236
  Unlike 
flat fees, this system charges based on the level of use; however, the 
price per volume of water is the same regardless of overall use.
237
  In this 
system, users pay more for higher use, but the price increase is propor-
tionally equal to the increase in gallons.
238
  This system is problematic in 
that it does not charge differently for discretionary and non-discretionary 
uses.
239
  While every household may need a certain quantity of water at 
an affordable rate, quantities above this should cost more if a price signal 
                                                          
ited and defined by the state government code.  Id.; GRIFFIN, supra note 25, at 255; see, e.g., TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 572.061 (West 2014). 
 228.  Glennon, supra note 16, at 1883.  Because water rates are based on cost of service, they can 
be highly variable depending on local conditions.  Brett Walton, The Price of Water: A Comparison 
of Water Rates, Usage in 30 U.S. Cities, CIRCLE OF BLUE (Apr. 26, 2010), 
http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2010/world/the-price-of-water-a-comparison-of-water-rates-
usage-in-30-u-s-cities/.  For some cities, paying for water use is a new concept.  Gene Haagenson, 
Nearly All Fresno Homes Now Have Metered Water, ABC NEWS – FRESNO (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?id=8934000.  For example, in Fresno, California controversial 
legislation required the installation of water meters.  Id.  Even in cities where water meters are the 
norm, multifamily units are not individually metered, giving residents no way to measure their 
monthly usage.  Alexis C. Madrigal, The Simple Gadget That Could Slash Apartment Buildings’ 
Water Use, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2011/11/the-simple-gadget-that-could-slash-apartment-buildings-water-use/247965/. 
 229.  Glennon, supra note 16, at 1883. 
 230.  KRISTINA DONNELLY & JULIET CHRISTIAN-SMITH, PACIFIC INSTITUTE, AN OVERVIEW OF 
THE “NEW NORMAL” AND WATER RATE BASICS 7–10 (June 2013), available at 
http://www.pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/pacinst-new-normal-and-water-rate-basics.pdf. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 8. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
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to minimize waste is desired.
240
 
An increasingly popular system is block or tiered rates.
241
  In this 
system, the unit price changes according to level of use.
242
  Blocks can be 
decreasing or increasing; however, decreasing block structures actually 
reward high water users.
243
  In contrast, increasing block rates charge 
higher prices for higher use, while still allowing water for basic needs to 
be available at a low rate.
244
  There is no set number, size or configura-
tion of the rate blocks required.
245
  The utility can determine the appro-
priate quantity of the first, least expensive block and the steepness of the 
block increase.
246
  Ideally the first block is for necessary indoor use and 
subsequent blocks are for increasing amounts of outdoor and other dis-
cretionary uses.
247
  When structured appropriately, these rates can be pu-
nitive to the small percentage of high discretionary water users and en-
courage conservation based on price signals.
248
 
Currently, conditions such as scarcity, environmental protection, and 
time of year are not built in to prices.  Water is inexpensive where supply 
is plentiful or infrastructure is inexpensive regardless of what the future 
portends.
249
  As water becomes scarcer necessitating increased infrastruc-
ture, technology costs, or water purchases, prices will increase accord-
ingly.
250
 
2. Agricultural Sector 
Any conversation about water sustainability and the role of markets 
must include agriculture because of its enormous water footprint.
251
  Irri-
gated agriculture accounts for 37% of all U.S. freshwater withdrawals 
and an average of 80% of America’s consumed water.252  This number 
                                                          
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. at 8–9. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id.; GRIFFIN, supra note 25, at 246–247. 
 244.  DONNELLY & CHRISTIAN-SMITH, supra note 230, at 9. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id.  The steeper the block increase, the more punitive it is to high end users.  Id. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Id.; GRIFFIN, supra note 25, at 247. 
 249.  HANEMANN, supra note 4, at 19. 
 250.  Glennon, supra note 16, at 1900; DONNELLY & CHRISTIAN-SMITH, supra note 230, at 2–6. 
 251.  See NANCY L. BARBER, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED WATER 
USE IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2005 (2009), available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2009/3098/pdf/2009-3098.pdf. 
 252.  Id. at 1; Irrigation & Water Use, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/ 
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varies considerably depending on location, with some states having up to 
85% of their water withdrawals and 90% of consumption go to irriga-
tion.
253
  Almost all irrigated water is considered consumed because it 
seeps into the earth and is not returned to the source.
254
 
In some regions, agriculture relies heavily on groundwater, which is 
often owned by the surface owner according to state law.
255
  One of the 
biggest disconnects between value and price occurs in the agricultural 
industry.
256
  While there is tremendous variability in pricing for agricul-
ture, on the whole, farmers pay considerably less for water than urban 
users even though agriculture accounts for the majority of national water 
consumption.
257
  The lack of a valuation indicator can lead to misman-
agement.
258
  The nominal fee for a water permit application may be the 
only price that a farmer will pay for the water.
259
  Depending on the 
source, there may be costs associated with getting the water to the sur-
face, but the water itself will have no cost and pumping is often unregu-
lated.
260
 
In other areas, farmers are required to purchase water from other 
suppliers resulting in a higher price.
261
  The largest public irrigation 
wholesaler in the West is the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which pro-
vides inexpensive water and subsidizes construction costs of irrigation 
                                                          
farm-practices-management/irrigation-water-use.aspx#.UoUGAo3FYck (last updated June 7, 2013).  
Withdrawal refers to a quantity of water that is removed or diverted from a water body for human 
use and then returned to the source.  2008–2009 Sustainability Report: Water and Energy, DUKE 
ENERGY, http://sustainabilityreport.duke-energy.com/2008/water/withdrawal.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014).  Consumed water refers to water that is not returned to the source after its removal often be-
cause of evaporative or saturation losses.  Id. 
 253.  JOAN F. KENNY ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE 
UNITED STATES IN 2005, at 4 (2009), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1344/pdf/c1344.pdf; Irri-
gation & Water Use, supra note 252. 
 254.  See How We Use Water in These United States, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jan. 27, 2004, 
2:42 PM), http://esa21.kennesaw.edu/activities/water-use/water-use-overview-epa.pdf. 
 255.  DENNIS WICHELNS, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., AGRICULTURAL WATER PRICING: 
UNITED STATES 9 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/45016437.pdf. 
According to Wichelns, “Texas obtains two-thirds of its irrigation withdrawals from groundwater, 
while groundwater accounts for 35% to 39% of irrigation withdrawals in California, Idaho, and Ari-
zona.  Nationwide, surface water accounts for 63% of irrigation withdrawals, while groundwater 
accounts for 37%.”  Id. at 11. 
 256.  See HANEMANN, supra note 4, at 19. 
 257.  WICHELNS supra note 255, at 6, 23; Irrigation & Water Use, supra note 252. 
 258.  See Adler, supra note 29, at 746 (quoting economists Terry L. Anderson and Pamela 
Snyder); Glennon, supra note 16, at 1885. 
 259.  WICHELNS, supra note 252, at 9–10 (discussing how farmers traditionally only pay their 
“own-supply costs,” such as the electricity to power a water pump). 
 260.  See Glennon, supra note 16, at 1899–1900. 
 261.  See WICHELNS, supra note 252, at 11 (describing water providers in different states). 
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projects.
262
  As water resources decrease and farm subsidies diminish, 
water prices for agriculture are likely to increase.
263
  These changes pro-
vide an excellent opportunity for markets and pricing to play a larger role 
in using water more efficiently in the agricultural sector.
264
  Any cost in-
creases for farmers have the potential to pass directly to consumers. 
B. Price as a Behavior Trigger 
Because communities are already paying for water, it follows that 
price could be used to manage the amount of water used and ensure that 
water goes to the highest value use.
265
  It is a basic principle of econom-
ics that people make choices based on a rational self-interest.
266
  Based 
on this assumption, human behavior can be predicted once the costs and 
benefits associated with an option are ascertained.
267
  Price is an obvious 
cost that might affect consumer decision making.
268
  It can affect what 
and how much of an item is purchased.
269
  In order for a person to con-
tinue purchasing an item at an increased cost, the benefit must also in-
crease for the decision to make sense.
270
  A consumer may also want to 
protect the environment through altruism and not just their own self-
interest.
271
  Many of these drivers are not included in current water mar-
ket regimes. 
“In a market economy prices are essential signals that tell producers 
and resource suppliers what and how much to produce.”272  When a mar-
ket goes out of equilibrium, price is what pulls it back.
273
  It is the auto-
matic regulator that manages the balance between supply and demand.
274
  
                                                          
 262.  Id. at 14. 
 263.  Id. at 23–24. 
 264.  See Frank A. Ward & Ari Michelsen, The Economic Value of Water in Agriculture: Con-
cepts and Policy Applications, 4 WATER POL’Y 423, 425–26 (2002). 
 265.  See FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 178. 
 266.  EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 9. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Id. at 11. 
 269.  Id. at 11, 54.  See, e.g., Lisa Hymas, How High Do Gas Prices Have to Get to Trigger Be-
havior Change?, GRIST (Mar. 14, 2012), http://grist.org/oil/5-is-the-new-4-how-high-do-gas-prices-
have-to-go-to-change-behavior/ (discussing people’s adjusted driving habits as a result of high gas 
prices for an extended time period). 
 270.  See EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 9. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. at 10. 
 273.  ROBIN BADE & MICHAEL PARKIN, FOUNDATIONS OF MICROECONOMICS 100 (2d ed. 2004). 
 274.  Id. 
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Prices also serve to allocate available commodities among competing 
end users.
275
  Demand and price have an inverse relationship.
276
  As pric-
es increases, the quantity demanded falls.
277
 
“In a perfect market, both buyers and sellers are numerous enough 
that no single buyer or seller can influence price.”278  This theory as-
sumes that the quantity of items available for purchase is only reliant on 
sellers making the good available; however, for a resource like water this 
theory is not true.
279
  Not only is there a fixed quantity of water in the 
world, but events like drought can reduce the quantity available in a cer-
tain region.
280
  According to economic theory, these supply reductions 
would eventually lead to a corresponding price increase.
281
 
It is often assumed that water demand is fairly inelastic; however, 
that is only true of nondiscretionary uses.
282
  Discretionary uses, such as 
lawn watering or wasteful indoor practices, are more elastic.
283
  Although 
there is no substitute for water, the user can choose to avoid watering al-
together or increase efficiencies to reduce total demand.
284
  Therefore, 
price elasticity of demand for water is effective on certain types of us-
es.
285
  In those areas, increased price can save a considerable amount of 
water.
286
  In drier climates, discretionary uses account for over fifty per-
cent of total water withdrawals, particularly in the hot summer months, 
creating a large opportunity to reduce usage through price triggers.
287
 
One important aspect of price accuracy is its inclusion of externali-
ties.
288
  An externality “represents a connection between economic agents 
                                                          
 275.  EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 11. 
 276.  Id. at 55. 
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 278.  Id. at 65. 
 279.  See id. 
 280.  WORLD WATER DAY 2013, supra note 178, at 2–3. 
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 282.  Adler, supra note 29, at 746–47; ZAAG & SAVENIJE, supra note 28, at 18. 
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 286.  See id. 
 287.  SAM MARIE HERMITTE & ROBERT E. MACE, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., TECHNICAL NOTE 12-
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available at https://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/technical_notes/doc/Seasonal 
WaterUseReport-final.pdf (discussing that the majority of water usage in these areas for individual 
households was for outdoor uses, such as lawn care). 
 288.  GRIFFIN, supra note 25, at 109; FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 269–71. 
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which lies outside the price system of the economy.  As the level of ex-
ternality generated is not controlled directly by price, the standard effi-
ciency theorems on market equilibrium cannot be applied.”289  There are 
many externalities not included in the current price of water, including 
scarcity, environmental consequences, and water quality degradation, 
just to name a few.
290
  While all of these have both a monetary and a so-
cial cost, those costs are borne outside and unrelated to the market, which 
artificially deflates prices.
291
  Although price can be used to affect de-
mand, this will only be effective in a properly functioning market.  Un-
fortunately, the current water market may be incapable of sending accu-
rate price signals. 
C. What’s Missing in this Market? 
Even if a market-based approach could encourage sustainable water 
use, many problems exist that prevent the current market from function-
ing in this way.  First, although money does change hands for water, a 
true water marketplace does not presently exist in most locations.
292
  In-
stead of a centralized trading place that would make supply and price 
available to all interested buyers, individual buyers seek out individual 
sellers resulting in extreme price variability and time requirements.
293
  
These exchanges take place much like any other contractual property 
transaction.
294
 
Even if a marketplace existed, many problems would remain.  One of 
                                                          
 289.  GRIFFIN, supra note 25, at 109 (quoting Gareth D. Myles). 
 290.  Id. at 216–20; Erin M. Tegtmeier & Michael D. Duffy, External Costs of Agricultural Pro-
duction in the United States, 2 INT’L J. OF AGRIC. SUSTAINABILITY 1, 1–2, 5–14 (2004), available at 
http://www.leopold.iastate.edu/pubs-and-papers/2004-01-external-costs-agricultural-production-
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 291.  See id. at 1–2. 
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cessfully bought and sold with effective price points based on scarcity and other value factors.  See, 
e.g., Fred O. Boadu et al., An Empirical Investigation of Institutional Change in Groundwater Man-
agement in Texas: The Edwards Aquifer Case, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 135–37 (2007) (describ-
ing the market impacts created by the Edwards Aquifer pumping cap). 
 293.  See, e.g., MONT. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES. & CONSERVATION TRUST LAND MGMT. DIV., 
WATER RIGHTS VALUATION (2012), available at http://dnrc.mt.gov/Trust/Reports/REMB/State 
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Montana Department of Natural Resources Trust Land Management Division). 
 294.  See Colby et al., supra note 223, at 1566–68 (specifically discussing the water market in 
New Mexico). 
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the keys for an efficient market is accurate pricing.
295
  Present water 
prices do not create an effective signal for the market because they often 
do not reflect true value.
296
  This is because water is often subsidized—
water itself is not priced—and externalities are not included.297  A market 
also requires timely changes in price.
298
  These changes reflect not only 
economic information such as supply, but political and social data as 
well.
299
 
For example, products like corn are traded on a commodities mar-
ket.
300
  When inclement weather or a government policy results in a de-
mand increase or supply reduction, price increases because less corn is 
brought to market.
301
  Accordingly, prices for products using corn will 
also increase.
302
  These price signals cause consumers to reevaluate their 
uses based on personal importance, which in turn affects total supply 
needed.
303
  No equivalent system for water exists. 
In order for markets to effectively alter societal behavior towards 
water and shift uses to the highest value when supply is low, price sig-
nals must occur in real time.
304
  Accurate pricing must also reflect factors 
such as weather conditions and environmental concerns.
305
  In contrast, 
because most water rights transactions are based on a specific contractual 
agreement,
306
 deals may not occur on the time scale necessitated by scar-
city.  This is particularly true if the transfer also requires regulatory ap-
proval.
307
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An additional challenge of market application to water is that, unlike 
many other goods, there is no substitute for water.
308
  Traditionally, when 
the price of one good increases the quantity demanded decreases, par-
ticularly if an appropriate substitute exists.
309
  When there is a reasonable 
substitute for an item, there is a higher price elasticity of demand because 
consumers can switch their choices.
310
  This is not true for basic water 
needs because there is no substitute for water.  For a water market to 
work there must be some value considerations made to incorporate the 
inelasticity of some water uses. 
Similarly, most items can substitute for themselves.  Corn grown in 
Iowa will not vary considerably from corn grown in Illinois.
311
  Although 
there may be different varieties, overall it is the same item, produced the 
same way.
312
  This consistency allows a price to be set for corn that can 
be charged across a large market.
313
  This is not the case for water.
314
  
Many factors vary for each water resource including its location, difficul-
ty of access, water quality, and priority date.
315
  Each of these has a price 
impact.
316
  Buyers in a water market also vary considerably.  Farmers 
need large quantities of water at a lower cost, and they can be flexible on 
water quality.
317
  In contrast, “urban and industrial users” require a firm 
yield of high quality water and are willing to pay more for it.
318
 
Transportation is also a market limitation.
319
  Water, unlike other 
commodities, cannot be easily purchased in one area and moved to its 
end point.
320
  Although North America has a network of pipelines to 
move gas and fuel,
321
 nothing equivalent exists for water.  Construction 
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of such infrastructure would be difficult, expensive, and time-
consuming.
322
  The inability to easily move water limits the participants 
in a given market to a localized region.
323
  While people located in prox-
imity to one another can buy and sell on the same market, someone from 
a water poor area may not be able to simply find a water rich area to fix 
the shortfall.
324
 
Finally there is the public good question of water.  Should water be 
up for sale and left to the highest bidder?
325
  There are also questions 
about how to weigh the environment in the price.
326
  Unlike corn, of 
which you can grow more the next season, there are questions regarding 
what happens when water is permanently removed from a drainage ba-
sin.
327
  Partially because of all the reasons listed above, the current mar-
ket exchange for water leads to unintended consequences because price 
signals are incomplete. 
V. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT MARKET SYSTEM 
Some system of water markets already exists in most regions, for-
mally or informally.
328
  Farmers pay to pump water even if they do not 
pay for the water itself.
329
  Cities obtain water and sell it to their custom-
ers.
330
  With water shortages increasing, cities and other users are looking 
to purchase water from other sources and import it to supplement current 
supply.
331
  In more jurisdictions, use permits can be transferred between 
users. 
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Unfortunately, this system has many shortcomings.  Although it po-
tentially moves water from a user who does not value it to one who does, 
there are also many unintended consequences that may arise because 
market influences are incomplete due to the lack of nonmonetary valua-
tion.
332
  Water is a public good that is necessary for life, so, in order to 
protect many of its uses and users into the future, the current market can-
not be left to its own devices.
333
  Without adjustments, problems that are 
already occurring will increase, creating more shortages. 
A. Price Signals Come Too Late 
Intrinsic in a working market is the assumption that price moves 
goods towards their highest value use and increases efficiency.
334
  The 
ultimate goal of a market is to ensure that a good is obtained by the per-
son who values it the most; however, with water another goal is critical: 
that water does not run out.
335
  The hope is to use markets to effectuate 
this goal, but, under current conditions, price triggers to reduce demand 
would occur after the water is gone and it is too late.
336
 
“Water usage is a function of available supply and the value of wa-
ter.”337  Value in this quote refers to current cost.338  The supply curve is 
based on the cost of production as well as demand.
339
  The least expen-
sive water is always the first to be used, which keeps prices low.
340
  Once 
that supply is gone, users turn to more expensive water alternatives and 
the corresponding cost increases.
341
  This increased cost shifts the supply 
curve such that the market equilibrium will also move and the price per 
unit will increase.
342
 
Increased price can be used to encourage efficient behavior.
343
  A 
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consumer with excess income might be willing to pay for a larger lawn 
even at a higher price; however, if price goes up and income stays the 
same, average consumers will decrease their use to accommodate the 
price change.
344
  The problem with using this model is that, assuming 
constant demand, price cannot increase unless supply decreases.
345
 
Water can also be affected by changes in the demand curve.
346
  Even 
if individual demand is constant, a growth in population can increase 
overall market demand.
347
  If there is not a corresponding increase in 
supply, the price per unit will increase, or individual demand will have to 
decrease to maintain market equilibrium.
348
  These market scenarios can 
occur in an extended drought, where a demand is challenged by a dwin-
dling resource, or the long-term problem created when a city grows be-
yond its current water resources and must turn to more expensive water 
options. 
The problem with this model is two-fold.  First, if the price of basic 
water needs goes up, and income does not increase, low income users on-
ly using water for non-discretionary uses will suffer.
349
  Using the tradi-
tional model, customers must either pay more or use less if they want 
their bill to remain constant after a rate increase.
350
  This system fails low 
income users because someone without the means cannot simply live 
without water.
351
  The second problem with this model is that price will 
increase only when costs increase, which is too late.
352
  The goal is to af-
fect behavior early enough to avoid new supply, not to change behavior 
because new supply is already required. 
The existing model is particularly problematic in drought or emer-
gency conditions because of its slow response to market needs.
353
  Tradi-
tional rate models do not have a mechanism for a rapid adjustment to af-
fect behavior and quickly scale back demand in emergency situations, 
                                                          
 344.  See FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 125–26. 
 345.  See EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 61–62. 
 346.  See FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 82, Figure 3.17. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id. 
 349.  See, e.g., Deborah Sullivan Brennan, SD Water Rates to Jump 15 Percent, U-T SAN DIEGO 
(Nov. 21, 2013, 8:20 PM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/Nov/21/environment-water-rate-
increase-san-diego/. 
 350.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 82, Figure 3.17. 
 351.  See CBC News, supra note 26 (explaining why people cannot survive without water). 
 352.  EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 63–64. 
 353.  See Rogers, supra note 30 (discussing California’s failure to require mandatory rationing 
despite being “[f]ourteen months into a historic drought”). 
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nor is there a way to affect price in a proactive manner.
354
  Instead, with-
out regulatory drought measures in place, climate neutral pumping will 
occur at a time when additional conservation is especially necessary, thus 
depleting particularly important supplies when they cannot be re-
placed.
355
  This creates an economic inefficiency. 
The current business model actually creates a negative feedback loop 
for the municipal provider: as price goes up, due to scarcity and the need 
for new expensive technology,
356
 people use less, but the utility needs to 
continue selling.
357
  Financial commitments to new projects often disin-
centivize conservation programs because sale of water is necessary to 
pay for the project.
358
  This can further increase demand and the need for 
even more supply. 
B. Water Flows Towards Money 
The primary assumption about markets creates the biggest problem 
that arises when markets are applied to water.  As previously discussed, a 
market transfers goods to those who value them the most.
359
  Intrinsic in 
this are two important assumptions.
360
  First, that everyone who values 
water has the money to purchase it; and two, that people are the only es-
sential recipients of water.  Both are false assumptions.
361
  Obviously, 
every human values water highly especially for basic needs; however, 
not everyone can pay for it at any price.
362
  An unregulated, open market 
                                                          
 354.  See, e.g., The Ratemaking Process, MO. PUB. SERVICE COMMISSION, 
http://psc.mo.gov/General/Ratemaking_Process (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (describing the arduous 
process of changing utility rates). 
 355.  See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 30 (reporting on California drought). 
 356.  Norimitsu Onishi, Arid Australia Sips Seawater, But at a Cost, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010, 
at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/world/asia/11water.html?_r=0 (discussing 
desalination plants in Australian cities and how the water bills “are expected to double over the next 
four years”). 
 357.  Glennon, supra note 16, at 1883–84. 
 358.  See Mark Schliebs, Mothballs at the Ready for $1.8bn Desal Plant, THE AUSTRALIAN 
(Mar. 26, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-
politics/mothballs-at-the-ready-for-18bn-desal-plant/story-e6frgczx-1226607172584# (reporting on 
an Australian desalination plan that was heavily funded but “will only operate until 2014 . . . .  [I]t 
will be an option to use if there are future water shortages”). 
 359.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 178. 
 360.  Id. 
 361.  Id. 
 362.  See JULIET CHRISTIAN-SMITH ET AL., PACIFIC INSTITUTE, ASSESSING WATER AFFORDABIL-
ITY: A PILOT STUDY IN TWO REGIONS OF CALIFORNIA 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2013/08/assessing-water-affordability.pdf (find-
ing “[c]ost makes water excludable and inaccessible to those who cannot afford it”). 
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could punish low income users simply because they cannot participate in 
the market allocation of resources.
363
  Similar issues can be seen outside 
of the individual user arena.  While there are a myriad of possible exam-
ples of these unintended consequences, a few seem particularly preva-
lent. 
1. Who Speaks for the Trees? 
The second false assumption mentioned above is that all water users 
can express their valuation of water through payment.  Clearly, humans 
are not the only users of water.
364
  The environment requires not only 
minimum flows of water, but pulse flows and floods as well.
365
  Some 
jurisdictions have attempted to protect these users with environmental 
flows policies, but many have not.
366
  This means water necessary for the 
health of the ecosystems will appear available to a user willing and able 
to purchase it for his or her own needs.
367
  If a market is the only force 
exerted on resources in a region, water may move towards buyers until 
nothing is left for the environment.
368
  Of course, at that point, the envi-
ronment’s value would increase and potentially shift decisions, but these 
systems cannot rebound quickly enough to avoid permanent losses.
369
  
Once again, the market reaction would be too late to be effective. 
One could argue that paying users who value the environment could 
represent those uses, but that option may not be possible under legal 
permitting schemes.  Water allocation may not allow someone to pur-
                                                          
 363.  See id. (asserting “[w]hen households are unable to make their water payments, conse-
quences can include public health crises, social unrest, and lost revenue for water providers that can 
threaten their fiscal stability”). 
 364.  See N. Leroy Poff & Julie K.H. Zimmerman, Ecological Responses to Altered Flow Re-
gimes: A Literature Review to Inform the Science and Management of Environmental Flows, 55 
FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 194, 195 (2010), available at http://filebox.vt.edu/users/dorth/E%20 
Flow%20Readings%20%20/Poff%20and%20Zimmerman%202010%20ecological%20responses%2
0%20to%20altered%20flow%20%20%20a%20literature%20review.pdf (explaining the impact of 
river flow on the survival of ecosystems and species). 
 365.  See id. at 198.  The study reviewed literature regarding the effect of “[a]lterations in flow 
frequency,” which were generally measured as decreased flood or peak flow frequency.  Id.  The 
papers observed that “aquatic macroinvertebrates and fishes” found “negative ecological responses” 
when a decrease in flood or peak flow occurred.  Id. 
 366.  See generally Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Return to the River: Environmental Flow Policy in 
the United States and Canada, 45 J. OF THE AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 1087, 1088–94 (2009). 
 367.  See FLOW: THE ESSENTIALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS 73–78 (Megan Dyson et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2008), available at https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/2008-096.pdf 
(describing the economic basis for adopting environmental water flows). 
 368.  See id. 
 369.  See id. 
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chase a water right for the express purpose of non-use.
370
  In addition, 
while everyone benefits from a healthy environment and ecosystem, few 
people realize its importance enough to directly pay for it.
371
  This ap-
proach would place the entire burden on the few who are willing and 
able to pay.  This again highlights the danger of individual market trans-
actions undermining the big picture.
372
  Water and the environment work 
together as a system, so managing them as a whole is necessary for sus-
tainability. 
The environment is not the only unspoken participant that stands to 
lose in the current market system.  Spiritual, cultural, and aesthetic uses 
are not considered until a water source is gone.
373
  Water is often at the 
center of communities for more reasons than its physical domestic us-
es.
374
  While cultural uses are frequently seen in association with indige-
nous peoples, the same connections occur in modern societies.
375
  Like 
the environment, these uses have an un-quantified value that is not real-
ized until it is in peril.  While price is an important motivator for behav-
ior, it is not alone in the factors that may be considered by a consumer.
376
  
The notion of self-interest can be read more broadly than financial.
377
  
Concerns such as sustainability, environmental protection, and aesthetics 
should also be included in the cost–benefit analyses that affect a person’s 
private choices as well as their public ones.
378
  Unfortunately, these val-
ues are not currently included in market valuation so they may be ig-
nored. 
None of these issues definitively mean that the market cannot be a 
helpful tool to manage water resources, but changes need to be made be-
                                                          
 370.  See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.0235(d)(1)–(2) (West 2013) (prohibiting the issu-
ance of a permit strictly for environmental uses). 
 371.  See FLOW, supra note 367, at 73–78. 
 372.  See id. 
 373.  See, e.g., NEVA COLLINGS, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENV’T, WA-
TER, POPULATION AND COMMUNITIES, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL & SPIRITUAL VALUES IN WATER 
QUALITY PLANNING 24 (2012), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/system/ 
files/resources/0aa6ea66-cd6f-4cbc-920b-368699e7711e/files/water-quality-planning-
indigenous.docx (explaining the role of water in the ceremonial lives of indigenous communities). 
 374.  See, e.g., id. at 15 (In Australia, the indigenous people use the Police Lagoons “as a func-
tioning wetland, meeting place, swimming hole, campsite, bora ring, and burial site.”). 
 375.  See generally Kirsten Rudestam, Loving Water, Resenting Regulation: Sense of Place and 
Water Management in the Willamette Watershed, 27 SOC’Y AND NAT. RESOURCES 20 (2014) 
(demonstrating that water plays a role in regional identity formation for inhabitants of the Pacific 
Northwest).  
 376.  EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 9. 
 377.  Id. 
 378.  Id. at 11. 
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fore that can occur.  If the market is going to help manage all uses, in-
cluding those without a paying user, then the value of non-paying uses 
needs to be represented in the market system or else they will be ignored. 
2. Farms v. Cities: The Comparative Value Challenge 
Another common issue that arises with increased resource depletion 
is competition for priority between users.  Although initial priority is of-
ten determined by a legal allocation regime, the transfer of legal permits 
or movement of water outside the legal system is dictated by those who 
can pay for it.  This can create additional unintended consequences.
379
  A 
sector severely threatened in this competition for use is agriculture.
380
 
The struggle for water between cities and agriculture stretches back 
more than a hundred years in western states.
381
  A commonly cited ex-
ample is William Mulholland’s diversion of water from the Owens River 
Valley to a quickly growing Los Angeles.
382
  Due to population concen-
tration and greater political representation, cities often dominate these 
struggles when they occur.
383
  Proponents of this outcome argue that do-
mestic needs of a city are more important than food production when 
there is not enough water for both.
384
  It is argued that farmers use a large 
                                                          
 379.  See, e.g., Neena Satija, LCRA Approves Plan That Could Cut Water for Rice Farmers in 
2014, THE TEX. TRIBUNE (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/11/19/lower-colorado-
river-authoritys-drought-proposal-s/; Healy, supra note 22 (providing examples of water competition 
for farmers). 
 380.  See, e.g., Shaun McKinnon, Water-Demanding Farms Looked at as Resources Vanish, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 25, 2009), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2009/ 
10/25/20091025water-users1025.html?nclick_check=1 (explaining the water-use conflict between 
Arizona farmers and Arizona Urban areas, with farmers requiring 70% of the water supply); Satija, 
supra note 379 (detailing a recently approved drought management plan that “is almost sure to cut 
off water for coastal rice farmers in the lower Colorado River Basin for the third year in a row”); 
Healy, supra note 22 (explaining that Colorado “[f]armers and environmental activists say they are 
worried that deep-pocketed energy companies will [] purchase [] increasingly scarce water supplies 
as they drill deep new wells that use the technique of hydraulic fracturing”). 
 381.  See, e.g., McKinnon, supra note 380 (the farming industry which was “tilled from the de-
sert more than a century ago” created “conflicts [that] have evolved from the clearly defined us vs. 
them - cities vs. farmers - to more nuanced sustainability issues”). 
 382.  MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 
62–86 (rev. ed. 1993).  Before Mulholland turned his attention to the Owens Valley for a permanent 
water supply, he turned off irrigation pumps in the San Fernando Valley during the 1904 drought to 
insure the city’s supply.  Id. at 62. 
 383.  See, e.g., Satija, supra note 379 (explaining that “for the third year in a row, the Lower 
Colorado River Authority voted” to approve a drought plan “cut[ting] off water for coastal rice 
farmers”). 
 384.  See, e.g., McKinnon, supra note 380 (explaining that “[u]rban areas have long viewed agri-
cultural water as a backup supply during a drought or other shortage”). 
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amount of water for a small amount of product, whereas a city can apply 
that same amount of water to satisfy more needs.
385
  Unfortunately, this 
is a limited view of the situation. 
Farmers are often maligned for their water use quantities and fre-
quent wasteful practices; however, when water is diverted to cities, it is 
for all municipal uses including unnecessary discretionary uses such as 
lawn watering.
386
  In times of plenty, this use may not be problematic, 
but when fields are forced to lie fallow so water can go to cities, ques-
tions arise as to whether the highest valued use was achieved.
387
  In addi-
tion to the reality that communities far and wide depend on the food 
grown by these farmers, there are also many ancillary businesses affected 
because a farm economy radiates beyond the farmer.
388
 
Markets can be used as devices for farmers to sell to municipal users, 
but for those who wish to keep their land in production, they may be 
fighting a losing battle.
389
  Additionally, in many of these situations, 
there may be unforeseen environmental impacts when farmers give up 
their water.
390
  For a market to be truly effective, it needs to consider the-
se other water impacts, such as impacts on water quality.  The focus 
should be on efficiency by all users and not just a shift from agricultural 
water to municipal water.
391
 
                                                          
 385.  See id. (estimating that agriculture uses 70% of the water in Arizona, but only accounts for 
1% of the state’s annual economic profits). 
 386.  See Todd Fitchette, Will Water Crisis be California’s Third-World Moment?, W. FARM 
PRESS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://westernfarmpress.com/blog/will-water-crisis-be-californias-third-
world-moment (citing lawn watering and swimming pool filling as wasteful municipal uses causing 
agricultural diminution). 
 387.  Compare Associated Press, Austin May Soon Need Extreme Water Restrictions, KVUE.COM 
(Oct. 4, 2013, 8:59 AM), http://www.kvue.com/news/local/Austin-may-soon-need-extreme-water-
restrictions-226460801.html (describing the potential of additional watering restrictions in Austin, 
Texas), with Satija, supra note 379 (forecasting LCRA’s curtailment of agricultural water so that 
Austin, Texas can receive its firm yield from LCRA).  See also McKinnon, supra note 380 (noting 
the importance of the food being grown by farmers losing water). 
 388.  See Felicity Barringer, Empty Fields Fill Urban Basins and Farmers’ Pockets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2011, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/science/earth/24water. 
html?pagewanted=all (discussing the impact that farming operations have on local economies). 
 389.  See id. (explaining that because the risks of farming are not worth it when crop prices are 
low, selling water allotments is a more practical course of action). 
 390.  See id.  Environmentalists worry that the large scale sale of agricultural water in California 
to cities will have dire consequences for the Salton Sea and create other environmental impacts such 
as increased air pollution resulting from fallow fields.  Id. 
 391.  Peter Gleick, Transcending Old Thinking About California Agricultural Water Use, 
SFGATE (Dec. 4, 2011, 12:17 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/gleick/2011/12/04/transcending-old-
thinking-about-california-agricultural-water-use/. 
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3. Water for Hydraulic Fracturing: Do Market Benefits Weigh the Costs? 
A more recent but quickly increasing water contest is occurring be-
tween the agricultural community and the industrial sector’s oil and gas 
exploration.
392
  The rapid increase of drilling resulting from the shale gas 
boom has put water in the middle of another tug-of-war.
393
  Hydraulic 
fracturing, or “fracking,” requires approximately five million gallons of 
water per well.
394
  To further exacerbate the issue, many of the shale gas 
formations targeted by this quickly growing industry are in high-water-
stress areas.
395
  In Texas, over 8,000 wells have been permitted in the last 
two years in just the Eagle Ford Shale.
396
  That adds up to a lot of water. 
While fracking operations can occur in both rural and municipal are-
as, they are primarily located in the rural landscape.
397
  Before these op-
erations blossomed, the land was being used for agricultural purposes, 
but the shift to gas development is drying out existing agricultural 
wells.
398
  In areas where there may be enough water for farmers and in-
dustry, the rapid increase in water demand has driven up the price of wa-
ter to an amount farmers can no longer afford.
399
 
A common response to this concern is to compare the “value” of the 
                                                          
 392.  Healy, supra note 22 (“A new race for water is rippling through the drought-scorched 
heartland, pitting farmers against oil and gas interests, driven by new drilling techniques that use 
powerful streams of water, sand and chemicals to crack the ground and release stores of oil and 
gas.”). 
 393.  See Kate Galbraith, In Texas, Water Use for Fracking Stirs Concerns, TEX. TRIBUNE (Mar. 
8, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/03/08/texas-water-use-fracking-stirs-concerns/ (explain-
ing that hydraulic fracturing, a new drilling method, is putting stress on a south Texas aquifer). 
 394.  CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, WATER USE IN EAGLE FORD DEEP SHALE EXPLORATION FACT 
SHEET 1 (May 2012), available at https://www.chk.com/Media/Educational-Library/Fact-
Sheets/EagleFord/EagleFord_Water_Use_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
 395.  Study: Fracking, Agriculture are on Water Demand ‘Collision Course’, UPI (Feb. 7, 2014, 
1:17 PM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2014/02/07/Study-Fracking-
agriculture-are-on-water-demand-collision-course/UPI-49051391797030/ (“97 percent of wells in 
Colorado and 96 percent of wells in drought-stricken California were in regions with high or ex-
tremely high water stress.”). 
 396.  Texas Eagle Ford Shale Drilling Permits Issued 2008 Through January 2014, TEX. RAIL-
ROAD COMMISSION DRILLING PERMIT QUERY (Feb. 10, 2014), available at 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/eagleford/EagleFordDrillingPermitsIssued.pdf. 
 397.  See FracMapper, FRACTRACKER, http://www.fractracker.org/map/ (last updated Mar. 
2014) (providing a map of all fracking wells in the U.S.). 
 398.  Suzanne Goldenberg, A Texan Tragedy: Ample Oil, No Water Fracking Boom Sucks Away 
Precious Water from Beneath the Ground, Leaving Cattle Dead, Farms Bone-Dry and People 
Thirsty, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2013, 10:07 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2013/aug/11/texas-tragedy-ample-oil-no-water (explaining that cotton farmers and cattle ranchers 
are giving up their trades because fracking is depleting the aquifer). 
 399.  See, e.g., Healy, supra note 22. 
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product generated from gas development versus farming.
400
  While it is 
true that oil and gas bring more money than crops, the long term conse-
quences of that water transfer are often not calculated.
401
  Much like the 
shift of water away from agriculture to cities, this change can create food 
shortages and environmental impacts.
402
  The latter is a particularly big 
issue because water used for fracking does not rejoin the water cycle.
403
 
While the applications of supply and demand are applicable to water, 
the question remains as to whether the market, in its current form, helps 
promote sustainability of water resources.  “Scarce resources are chan-
neled to those who can produce a desired product in the least costly fash-
ion for the demanders who most desire the product.  Another way of say-
ing this is that resources flow to their most highly valued uses.”404  This 
economic assumption depends on how we define “highly valued use.”  If 
the market can be changed to reflect some of these additional values, 
then the good can go to the person who values them the most and not just 
the person who can pay for them.
405
 
VI. MATCHING PRICE TO TRUE VALUE: VISIONS OF A NEW MARKET 
MODEL 
Water is a critical resource necessary for both survival and economic 
success.  To achieve these, water supplies must be sustainable into the 
future.  While current legal regimes seek to achieve these goals, their fo-
cus on protecting property rights often threatens their ability to ensure 
water is used most efficiently.
406
  While economic success requires some 
property ownership, that alone will not ensure the best use of a re-
source.
407
  Applied properly, markets can supplement policy shortcom-
ings.  However, current market regimes fail to consider all sources of sat-
isfaction, represent all users, and weigh the benefits to society.
408
  
                                                          
 400.  See id. (quoting Tisha Schuller, president of the Colorado Oil and Gas Association, as argu-
ing that fracking “is an important use of our water [because it] produce[s] energy, which is the foun-
dation of all we do”). 
 401.  Id. 
 402.  Id. 
 403.  Dan Aiello, CA Farmer Warns: ‘Don’t Trust Oil Industry, State or Courts’ to Protect Wa-
ter, EXAMINER.COM (May 27, 2013), http://www.publicherald.org/archives/17697/investigative-
reports/energy-investigations/fracking-energy-investigations/. 
 404.  EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 67–68. 
 405.  Id. at 88.  
 406.  TARLOCK, supra note 33, at 293–95. 
 407.  FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 5, at 282. 
 408.  YOUNG, supra note 68, at 3 (citing Tibor Scitovsky). 
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Therefore, the current market system must be adjusted to ensure its effi-
cacy before it is implemented more heavily in water management.
409
 
A. Internalize Externalities: Giving Value to the Unvalued 
Philosophers refer to two major types of value: extrinsic and intrin-
sic.
410
  Intrinsic value involves a good’s value for its own sake, without 
regard to where it leads.
411
  Extrinsic valuation represents values as-
signed to the item because of the benefits it can bring outside of the value 
in its existence.
412
  Extrinsic value is given to an item for its ability to 
achieve something else.
413
  Ideally, the price of a good would reflect both 
its intrinsic value as well as human and welfare considerations—extrinsic 
value.
414
  Unfortunately for many goods, particularly natural resources, 
extrinsic values are omitted from price, resulting in an artificially re-
duced price.
415
  Omitted costs are still incurred, but they cannot be con-
sidered as part of the purchase decision because no price signal exists. 
One of the concerns with the current market approach to water is that 
price excludes many factors, so it does not fully inform market drivers.  
Essentially, price does not reflect water’s full intrinsic value.416  This in-
accurate price signal creates unintended consequences.
417
  Many of these 
consequences can be identified as externalities.
418
 
An externality is defined as a cost and benefit of an individual’s be-
havior or activity that the individual does not bear.
419
  It can be positive 
or negative.
420
  Because externalities are not controlled by price, market 
                                                          
 409.  See id. at 3 (explaining that current water policies are ineffective). 
 410.  Id. at 24.  See also Rem B. Edwards, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation, 13 J. 
VALUE INQUIRY 133, 133–35 (1979) (discussing intrinsic and extrinsic valuation). 
 411.  Edwards, supra note 410, at 134–35; YOUNG, supra note 68, at 24. 
 412.  Edwards, supra note 410, at 135–36.  For example, the extrinsic value of the environment 
would stem from the direct use of it, whereas an intrinsic value might be the protection of endan-
gered species.  YOUNG, supra note 68, at 24. 
 413.  Edwards, supra note 410, at 135–36; YOUNG, supra note 68, at 24. 
 414.  See YOUNG, supra note 68, at 25 (citing two water “manuals [that] call for a determination 
of environmental impacts (intrinsic values) to be balanced against human (both economic and social) 
welfare considerations (extrinsic values)”). 
 415.  See YOUNG, supra note 68, at 24–25 (explaining the valuation of water and how scarcity 
factors in). 
 416.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 417.  See supra Part V. 
 418.  EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 9, at 94. 
 419.  Id. 
 420.  Id. 
  
2014] WATER VALUATION DILEMMA 933 
efficiency theorems like supply and demand cannot be applied.
421
  One 
solution to avoid this problem is to include externalities in the price.
422
  
The process of inclusion would bring these factors inside market effi-
ciency assumptions and would align agent choices with the socially de-
sired choice, rather than simply direct water to the person who can pay 
the most for it.
423
 
Although there is potentially a long list of values that should be in-
ternalized within the price of water, perhaps the most important are the 
environmental impacts caused by dewatering.
424
  Society as a whole ben-
efits from a functioning and thriving environment.
425
  The destruction of 
an ecosystem can have severe economic consequences affecting many 
industries.
426
  Healthy ecosystems depend on a certain quantity of decent-
quality water, yet no market exists for this use.
427
 
In a free market, water moves towards whoever is able to pay the 
highest amount, and the market assumes that this user represents water’s 
highest value use, but the environment cannot be a market competitor.
428
  
Therefore, the value of the environment needs to be included in the price 
of water so market decisions can weigh environmental considerations.
429
 
A natural goal related to water allocation protocols is to ensure the 
resource does not disappear and become unavailable to those with a wa-
ter right.
430
  To achieve this, water must be used in the most efficient way 
possible, particularly under drought conditions.
431
  Unfortunately, under 
the current market scheme, price cannot guarantee the best use of water.  
                                                          
 421.  GRIFFIN, supra note 25, at 109. 
 422.  Id. at 110. 
 423.  Id. 
 424.  See Poff & Zimmerman, supra note 364, at 195 (explaining “that ubiquitous flow alteration 
threatens the biodiversity and ecosystem functions of rivers on a global scale”). 
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mental damage on the world economy). 
 426.  Id. 
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Instead, price will only respond once the water runs out.
432
  At that point, 
price impacts can be severe, because both the cost of using less water and 
the price to purchase and import water will be far higher.
433
  It is benefi-
cial to send a price signal earlier and include the cost of inaction in the 
current price in order to avoid the crisis altogether. 
The best method to include the cost of doing nothing into price is to 
“ask[] people directly what they could be willing to pay contingent on 
some hypothetical change in the future state of the world.”434  In this 
case, the question would be what someone is willing to pay for water to 
avoid future supply depletion.
435
  If buyers understood through price sig-
nals that adopting efficient uses now could bypass that end result, their 
behavior might change accordingly.
436
 
Other important values worth quantifying are the less considered 
“uses” such as sense of place and aesthetics.437  These uses capture the 
public good aspect of water.
438
  When water is allocated, it is allocated 
among users for use in a particular sector; however, there are many other 
existing uses of that water enjoyed by the public.
439
  Currently, the at-
tempt to apply markets to public goods results in failure because there is 
not a representative for that rival good.
440
  However, if this value could 
be included in price then it would not go neglected.
441
  Otherwise, poli-
cies will have to be relied upon to protect these uses.
442
 
B. Adjustments in Municipal Pricing Regimes 
Perhaps the most frequent water transaction is the sale of water de-
livery from a water utility to a municipal domestic or commercial user.
443
  
                                                          
 432.  See supra Part V.A. 
 433.  See supra Part V.A. 
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 442.  Id. at 109. 
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In the U.S., over 300 million customers receive their water from a utili-
ty.
444
  This provides a huge opportunity to affect behavior through price 
and an equally large chance that water is being used inefficiently.  Proper 
rate structures can send appropriate signals to users to minimize wasteful 
behavior, particularly for discretionary needs.
445
 
Currently, rates are determined based on a limited cost of service 
analysis.
446
  Depending on the jurisdiction, rates can only be used to re-
coup the utility’s costs for items including operation and maintenance, 
capital costs, and debt service.
447
  This constrains rate collection, which 
is the price placed on water, to costs that have already been incurred.
448
  
Only once inexpensive water resources are depleted and the utility is 
forced to seek additional, more expensive, supplies will rates increase.
449
 
Water has economic value only when its supply is scarce relative to its 
demand. . . .  Scarce water takes on economic value because many us-
ers compete for its use.  In a market system, economic values of water, 
defined by its price, serve as a guide to allocate water among alterna-
tive uses, potentially directing water and its complementary resources 
into uses in which they yield the greatest total economic return.
450
 
When low rates are the only price signal received by millions of city 
dwellers, there is no incentive to conserve until it is too late.
451
  This is 
not an effective use of markets to ensure product efficiency. 
The key is to include a price signal to conserve before it is absolutely 
necessary.  This will help current users assess the value of the available 
water and use it more efficiently, hopefully requiring less per house-
hold.
452
  Water conserved through these efforts can supplement supply 
and prolong the need for additional measures.
453
  This approach to rates 
can also mitigate the perverse incentive utilities have to discourage con-
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servation to generate revenues to pay for new supply projects.
454
 
In order to provide an effective price signal, limitations on what 
costs a utility can pass through to ratepayers must be expanded from the 
current alternatives.
455
  This is akin to internalization of externalities in 
that the utility needs to incorporate the value of avoided supply into cur-
rent rates.
456
  This may appear as though people will be forced to pay for 
something they may not need, but a benefit is still being gained.  All oth-
er costs associated with new supply are avoided including land impacts, 
energy, and pollution costs.
457
  In addition, there may not be new supply 
readily available.
458
  In essence, ratepayers are paying a small price up 
front to avoid an emergency later.
459
 
Pricing structures should target the elastic portion of water de-
mand.
460
  One factor that determines price elasticity of demand is the in-
come effect of a product.
461
  When a price increases, people usually can-
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not afford to buy the same amount of the product that they could have at 
the previous price.
462
  The greater the proportion of an individual’s in-
come needed to purchase the item, the greater the impact of the price in-
crease on consumer demand.
463
  That demand is elastic.
464
 
Basic uses of water are inelastic.  A user cannot simply require less 
water for health and hygiene because the price goes up, but those uses 
account for a very small percentage of household uses.
465
  Some indoor 
uses can be reduced through more efficient plumbing or behavior modi-
fications, but the largest and most elastic water uses occur outdoors.
466
  
Pricing structures need to target discretionary use through a block system 
that prices the nondiscretionary uses very low, but penalizes uses that are 
clearly optional.
467
  The proper punitive price signal could result in sig-
nificant water savings because many users may forego that use entirely 
based on cost.
468
 
Another alternative is to levy an additional fee during times of short-
age when the utility needs to send an immediate price signal unrelated to 
traditional rates.  This temporary drought surcharge would help avoid 
shortages and more closely align water with its appropriate value under 
the circumstances.
469
  It also avoids the need for a long, politically diffi-
cult rate case, which is not necessary if the shortage is temporary.
470
  
This fee can be prorated based on use.  Those who use the most water 
can pay a higher fee with the assumption that they are continuing to use 
discretionary water even at a critical time.  Municipal users are an excel-
lent opportunity for improvement in water efficiency, but they are not the 
only users who must be considered. 
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C. The Agriculture Challenge 
Water sustainability requires the involvement of all use sectors.  Be-
cause of its high water use, agriculture is a critical stakeholder in any 
conversation on water and the application of markets.
471
  Nationally, ag-
riculture represents almost 40% of all freshwater withdrawals.
472
  A large 
portion of that is consumed and not available for other users.
473
  The 
challenge when discussing irrigated farming and water markets is to real-
ize that, while there is an opportunity for markets, farming may be a vic-
tim of markets as well.
474
  Ideally, markets can be used to encourage effi-
ciencies on farmland while protecting the industry itself from higher 
grossing competitors. 
While farming is an essential part of the American economy, it can-
not be overlooked that large amounts of acreage continue to be farmed 
using wasteful irrigation practices.
475
  In addition to using large amounts 
of water, many farmers hold powerful water rights so the law protects 
and prioritizes them in times of shortage.
476
  Because there are limited 
policy alternatives to change behavior, one way to encourage more effi-
cient technologies is through water pricing.
477
  Most agricultural users 
pay very little for their water, which creates little incentive to replace an-
tiquated, wasteful technology with more efficient systems.
478
  To solve 
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this disconnect, the price of water needs to be increased to reflect its val-
ue to technology upgrades. 
Adjusting water prices for irrigation is not without its challenges.  In 
many areas, there is no institution in place to assess the complex pricing 
necessary for swift and accurate market transfers.
479
  Additional price ad-
justments must also be made during times of scarcity similar to addition-
al charges that might be included in the municipal sector.
480
  Using mar-
kets to increase efficiency is more than just increasing the price per unit 
of water.
481
  Markets must work with water agencies to safeguard other 
users, such as the environment.
482
 
Although markets can be utilized to help modernize agricultural 
practices, markets need modification to ensure farming is compared fair-
ly to other industries.  Currently, agricultural valuation is often underes-
timated because focus is on the price of the product and not the product’s 
total value.
483
  Often water is diverted from agriculture to other users us-
ing a skewed economic argument, which presents another example of the 
need for internalization of externalities.
484
  There is a value of a product 
beyond the price received for it at market just as there might be a cost.
485
 
In order to fully account for the value of agricultural markets, one 
must look beyond the price given for food and include the value of hav-
ing food products available for domestic consumption and exportation.
486
  
Dependent economies should also be included.
487
  When an acre of food 
is grown, the farmer selling the crop is not the only recipient of in-
come.
488
  There is a community of related economies that benefit includ-
ing seed providers, workers, and equipment dealers to name a few.
489
  
The money earned by these dependent businesses should be included in 
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agricultural valuation. 
Conversely, the cost of other industries must be included compared 
to irrigation.  For example, in the comparison of agriculture and hydrau-
lic fracturing, the consumptive use of the latter should be included.
490
  
There are also higher environmental risks with fracking than there is with 
agriculture.
491
  When comparing municipal and agricultural use, it is 
worthwhile to note that while municipal use serves more people, not all 
municipal uses are efficient and necessary.
492
  If water is priced in a way 
that minimizes municipal waste, then more water is available for agricul-
ture and more overall needs are met.
493
  The goal of the market should be 
the efficiency of all end users, not just one category of user. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Water allocation is currently controlled by policy that assigns a 
property right and hopes to protect the resource and its users.
494
  Unfor-
tunately, legal allocation schemes often focus more on defining and pro-
tecting the property right than they do on ensuring sustainability of the 
resource.
495
  In lieu of expanded policy, markets can help fill this void 
and increase efficiency by assigning an accurate value to the good, send-
ing a price signal that impacts behavior.
496
  Markets can dictate how the 
water is transferred after the right has been assigned and how people use 
their right. 
Unfortunately, current markets lack the ability to send an accurate 
price signal that reflects the true value of water.
497
  This erroneous in-
formation leads to unintended consequences that could rapidly deplete 
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resources rather than protect them.
498
  The need to ensure market accura-
cy is particularly important for water because it is a basic resource for 
which nothing can be substituted.  In order for a market to be a useful 
tool in water planning and protection, adjustments must be made to en-
sure that all costs are included.
499
 Once that happens, then price signals 
are correct and consumer decisions can be made accordingly. 
Water pricing should include currently absent externalities such as 
the cost of dewatering the environment and ecosystems.
500
  The cata-
strophic failure of an ecosystem would seriously impact regional econo-
mies as well as the less quantifiable, but still important, sense of place 
and aesthetics.  Presently, consumers pay little for water, which does not 
allow such considerations to be part of a water transaction.
501
  The low 
price of water does not accurately convey its value or the importance of 
its protection.  In some circumstances, it actually encourages waste and 
dewatering. Until price matches value, the increased use of markets will 
cause more harm than good.
502
 
Market adjustments also need to be made in the municipal sector to 
target discretionary uses such as outdoor watering.
503
  Utilities need to be 
given the ability to set their rates in a way that does not simply recoup 
costs, but actually encourages conservation and efficiency.
504
  Water 
providers need to be able to charge more for existing, less expensive 
supplies to avoid the need to build more expensive technologies that may 
disincentivize conservation programs.
505
  Additional fees can be collect-
ed during drought periods on a pro rata basis to trigger an immediate 
demand response.
506
 
In the agricultural sector, price again needs to be matched to value.
507
  
Large amounts of acreage still rely on inefficient, wasteful irrigation sys-
tems.  New systems are expensive to install and the low cost of water 
provides no incentive to do so.  Increased water prices would result in 
better efficiencies and the farmers could use less and release the saved 
                                                          
 498.  See supra Part V. 
 499.  See supra Part VI. 
 500.  See supra Part VI.A. 
 501.  See supra Part VI.B.1. & VI.A. 
 502.  See supra Part III.A. 
 503.  See supra Part III.B. 
 504.  See supra Part III.B. 
 505.  See supra Part III.B. 
 506.  See supra Part III.B. 
 507.  See supra Part VI.C. 
  
942 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
water to new users or the environment.
508
  Markets can also be used to 
protect farmers from unfair valuations that include only the cost of the 
product without other considerations.
509
  Water shortages are becoming 
more common as competition for access increases.  Markets can be a 
useful corollary to policy, but only if they have appropriate inputs. 
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